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Abstract
To ensure that a trust negotiation succeeds when-
ever possible, authorization policy compliance check-
ers must be able to find all minimal sets of their own-
ers’ credentials that can be used to satisfy a given
policy. If all of these sets can be found efficiently
prior to choosing which set should be disclosed, many
strategic benefits can also be realized. Unfortunately,
solving this problem using existing compliance check-
ers is too inefficient to be useful in practice. Specifi-
cally, the overheads of finding all satisfying sets using
existing approaches have been shown to rapidly grow
exponentially in the size of the union of all satisfying
sets of credentials for the policy, even after optimiza-
tions have been made to prune the search space for
potential satisfying sets.
In this paper, we describe the Clouseau compli-
ance checker. Clouseau leverages efficient pattern-
matching algorithms to find all satisfying sets of cre-
dentials for a given policy in time that grows as
O(NA), where N is the number of satisfying sets for
the policy and A is the average size of each satis-
fying set. We describe the design and implementa-
tion of the Clouseau compliance checker, evaluate
its performance as the number and size of satisfying
sets for a given policy varies, and show that it vastly
outperforms existing approaches to finding all satis-
fying sets of credentials. We then present a method
for automatically compiling RT policies into a for-
mat suitable for analysis by Clouseau and prove
the correctness and completeness of this compilation
procedure.
1 Introduction
In trust negotiation approaches to authorization
(e.g. [5, 9, 17, 22, 23, 24]), resources are protected
by attribute-based access policies, rather than ex-
plicit access control lists. Entities use cryptographic
credentials issued by third-party attribute certifiers
(e.g., professional organizations, employers, or gov-
ernment bodies) to prove various attributes about
themselves. Since these attributes might themselves
be considered sensitive, they can optionally be pro-
tected by release policies placing constraints on the
individuals to whom they can be disclosed. As such,
a trust negotiation session evolves into a bilateral and
iterative exchange of policies and credentials with the
end goal of developing new trust relationships on-the-
fly. Because these types of systems allow resource
administrators to specify the intention of a policy,
rather than its logical extension (i.e., an access con-
trol list), authorized entities can gain access to avail-
able resources without requiring that their identity
be known a priori.
The design of robust and highly-available trust ne-
gotiation systems hinges on the availability of effi-
cient policy compliance checkers. Given a policy p
and a set C of credentials, the compliance checker
is responsible for determining one or more minimal
subsets of C that satisfy p. We call these minimal
subsets satisfying sets of credentials. To ensure that
trust negotiation protocols establish trust whenever
possible, the compliance checkers used by these sys-
tems must be capable of finding all satisfying sets of
credentials for a given policy. This enables the ne-
gotiator to attempt alternate means of establishing
trust in the event that the initially-chosen negotia-
tion tactic leads to a deadlock or other dead end.
Trust negotiation is intrinsically a strategy-driven
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process in which the participants each attempt to
advance the state of the protocol while maximizing
their own particular goals [27]. For instance, the so-
called eager and parsimonious negotiation strategies
allow negotiation participants to balance a trade-off
between negotiation speed and privacy by choosing
to disclose either all credentials that a remote party
is authorized to view or only those that have been
deemed relevant to satisfying the policy at hand, re-
spectively [23]. If a negotiation participant is able to
determine all satisfying sets of credentials for a given
policy a priori, much finer-grained strategies can be
employed. For example:
• If entities assign point values to individual cre-
dentials that indicate each credential’s level of
sensitivity (e.g., as in [26]), the negotiation pro-
cess can respond to a given policy by disclosing
the satisfying set with the lowest overall sensi-
tivity.
• In the event that an entity has digital credentials
representing memberships in organizations that
may lead to various types of discounts or prefer-
ential treatment (e.g., AAA, AARP, or frequent
flyer credentials), they could employ a negotia-
tion strategy that discloses satisfying sets con-
taining these types of credentials first.
• In some cases, entities might wish to minimize
the cumulative number of credentials disclosed
over multiple rounds of a given trust negotiation
session; a simple greedy algorithm could be used
to determine the satisfying set that minimizes
the overall number of credentials disclosed.
• A party might wish to steer the negotiation in
the direction most likely to minimize its dura-
tion. For example, a server may wish to lead the
negotiation in the direction that the analysis of
logs of past negotiations has shown to be the way
that most users gain access.
Existing compliance checkers designed for trust ne-
gotiation policy languages find at most one satisfying
set of credentials at a time, but can be operated in an
iterative manner to discover alternate satisfying sets
in the event that the first set found leads to a nego-
tiation path that fails to establish trust. While this
iterative approach to discovering satisfying sets is suf-
ficient to ensure the completeness of trust negotiation
protocols, it is a very slow way to discover all satis-
fying sets at once. As a result, it is unrealistic to use
this approach as the basis for the types of strategies
discussed above. Specifically, the overheads of find-
ing all satisfying sets using such an approach have
been shown to grow exponentially in the size of the
union of all satisfying sets of credentials for the pol-
icy, even after optimizations have been made to prune
the search space for potential satisfying sets [21].
In this paper, we describe the design and imple-
mentation of Clouseau, a highly-efficient and policy
language-agnostic compliance checker for trust nego-
tiation systems. Rather than discovering satisfying
sets of credentials using a top-down proof construc-
tion system, Clouseau solves the policy compliance
checking problem by compiling policies into a for-
mat that can be efficiently analyzed using solutions to
the many pattern/many object pattern match prob-
lem. Given a set of patterns and a set of objects,
algorithms for solving this problem find all patterns
matched by subsets of the provided objects. Inter-
nally, Clouseau represents access control policies
as patterns specifying constraints on the credentials,
credential chains, and uncertified claims (e.g., phone
numbers, addresses, etc.) that must be presented to
gain access to a particular resource. The Rete algo-
rithm [13] is then used to find all satisfying sets by
efficiently matching objects representing a user’s cre-
dentials and claims against these patterns. Overall,
Clouseau makes several important contributions re-
lated to the compliance checker problem for trust ne-
gotiation systems:
• Clouseau requires only tens of milliseconds, on
average, to determine every satisfying set of cre-
dentials associated with a reasonably-sized pol-
icy; this is comparable to the time required by
existing trust negotiation compliance checkers to
find one satisfying set.
• To the best of our knowledge, Clouseau rep-
resents the first trust negotiation compliance
checker capable of finding all satisfying sets of
credentials for a given policy with time overheads
that scale as O(NA), where N is the number of
satisfying sets for a policy and A is the average
size of each satisfying set. Previous solutions to
this problem have running time overheads that
grow exponentially in the size of the union of all
satisfying sets. As a concrete example, the itera-
tive solution presented in [21] takes over 10 sec-
onds to find two overlapping satisfying sets con-
taining a total of 20 credentials, whileClouseau
finds the same satisfying sets in approximately
40 ms.
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• In the worst case, the number of satisfying sets
for a given policy can be exponential in the size of
the policy. However, Clouseau’s performance
remains reasonable even when policies become
inordinately complex. For example, Clouseau
can find 512 satisfying sets each of size 18 in
approximately one second; we have not found
policies of this complexity being used in prac-
tice or mentioned elsewhere in the research lit-
erature. In Section 6, we show that policies as
complex as even the most complicated policies
used in Becker’s formalization of the security re-
quirements for the UK’s electronic health records
service [2] can be analyzed by Clouseau in un-
der 100 ms.
• Since it can efficiently find all satisfying sets of
credentials for a given policy, Clouseau makes
the use of “smarter” trust negotiation strategies
practical. In Section 6, we show that Clouseau
is very fast at finding the minimum-weight (e.g.,
least-sensitive) satisfying set of credentials for a
given policy.
• The design of a single highly-optimized compli-
ance checker capable of analyzing policies writ-
ten in any policy language would allow entities to
write policies without worrying about the costs
of analyzing them. Clouseau compiles policies
written in high-level policy languages into an
intermediate representation that specifies con-
straints on the actual credentials used to sat-
isfy a given access control policy, which it can
then efficiently analyze. We present a process for
automatically compiling RT [18] policies into a
format that can be analyzed by Clouseau and
prove the correctness and completeness of this
compilation procedure. Since policies written in
all existing trust negotiation policy languages are
satisfied by the same types of evidence, we con-
jecture that equivalent compilation mechanisms
could be specified for the other languages as well.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We
begin with a discussion of related work in Section 2.
We then formally define the specific instance of the
more general policy compliance checking problem
solved by Clouseau in Section 3. Section 4 describes
the Rete algorithm, presents the design and imple-
mentation of the Clouseau compliance checker, and
discusses the internal representation of policies and
evidence used by Clouseau. We present a procedure
for automatically compiling RT policies into a format
suitable for analysis by Clouseau in Section 5. In
Section 6 we conduct a series of experiments to eval-
uate the performance of Clouseau and compare its
benefits and limitations to those of other compliance
checking approaches. Lastly, we present our conclu-
sions and directions for future work in Section 7.
2 Related Work
In [20], the authors broadly classify policy compli-
ance checkers for trust management and trust negoti-
ation systems into three categories. They first define
type-1 compliance checkers as functions that return
only a Boolean result indicating whether the policy
in question was satisfied. Compliance checkers for
the PolicyMaker [7, 8] and KeyNote [6] trust man-
agement systems are included in this first category,
as the non-iterative nature of these systems makes
the discovery of why a particular access was permit-
ted superfluous; simply knowing that the compliance
checker can construct a formal proof of authorization
is sufficient. The CPOL compliance checker [10] is a
highly-optimized compliance checker designed to en-
force access policies on centralized resources in high-
throughput environments, such as location-detection
systems. CPOL uses aggressive caching and other
optimizations to achieve incredible performance, but
does not return evidence supporting the binary deci-
sions that it makes. Lastly, the compliance checker
for Ponder [12], which is used for policy-based net-
work administration, also falls into this first category.
Type-2 compliance checkers return one satisfying
set of credentials in addition to a Boolean value in the
case that a policy is found to be satisfied. The com-
pliance checker used by the REFEREE system [11]
is capable of returning such justifications, though it
need not do so. It is important to note that the abil-
ity to associate at least one satisfying set of creden-
tials with a compliance checker decision is required by
the trust negotiation process, as otherwise individuals
could not determine which credentials should be sent
to their negotiation partner after they determine that
a remote policy can be satisfied. As such, the compli-
ance checkers for the XML-based policy languages X -
TNL [4] and the IBM Trust Policy Language [15] fall
into this category, as do compliance checkers for ex-
isting logic-based trust negotiation policy languages,
such as Cassandra [3] and the language presented by
Koshutanski and Massacci in [16].
Lastly, type-3 compliance checkers are defined as
functions that return every minimal set of credentials
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that can be used to satisfy a particular policy. To
date, no trust negotiation compliance checkers have
been developed expressly for this purpose, although
significant strategic benefits could be recognized by
such a compliance checker. In [21], Smith et al. dis-
cuss several important uses of this type of compliance
checker and describe the Satisfying Set Generation
(SSgen) algorithm for discovering all satisfying sets
for a given policy using a type-2 policy compliance
checker. They show that when policies are expressed
in disjunctive normal form (DNF), then a number of
clever optimizations can be made to prune the state
space that must be searched for satisfying sets of cre-
dentials. They then evaluate the performance of an
implementation of the SSgen algorithm that used the
IBM TE compliance checker [15] as the base type-2
compliance checker.
Figure 1 is a reproduction of the results presented
in [21] depicting the running times of the SSGen al-
gorithm. The three most interesting cases in which
the SSgen algorithm was evaluated include the cases
in which (i) a policy has one satisfying set of size U ,
(ii) a policy has U satisfying sets of size one, and (iii)
a policy has two satisfying sets, each of size 3U4 . In
all cases, U represents the size of the union of all sat-
isfying sets and was varied between 1 and 24. In case
(i), the SSgen algorithm scaled linearly with U in the
sub-second time range. In cases (ii) and (iii), the SS-
gen algorithm’s running time increased exponentially
with U and rapidly became impractical.
Clouseau improves upon this previous work by
compiling trust negotiation policies into an inter-
mediate representation that can be analyzed using
efficient pattern matching algorithms. This non-
traditional approach to theorem proving greatly op-
timizes the process of finding all possible satisfying
sets of credentials for a given policy. Further, be-
cause existing trust negotiation policy languages can
be compiled into a format that can be analyzed using
Clouseau, developers can optimize trust negotiation
runtime systems while still allowing policy writers to
continue to use existing high-level policy languages.
3 Problem Definition
At its most basic level, a trust negotiation session
is a bilateral and iterative exchange of access poli-
cies and evidence conducted to establish mutual trust
between two parties. For example, a student that
wishes to access a resource connected to a comput-
ing grid might be returned a policy stating that only
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Figure 1: Running time of the SSGen algorithm as a
function of the size of the union of all satisfying sets.
full-time students at accredited universities can ac-
cess that resource. Prior to proving her enrollment
status to the resource operator, the student might
first require that the resource operator prove that it
is operated by either an NSF-sponsored organization
or an organization that is a member of the Better
Business Bureau. Digital credentials, such as X.509
certificates, are the most common form of evidence
used by these protocols, although uncertified claims
(as in [5, 9]), proof fragments (as in [1, 25]), or trust
tickets (as in [5]) could also be exchanged. In the re-
mainder of this paper, we will define E as the set of
all such evidence and P as the set of all policies.
Formally, a compliance checker is defined as a func-
tion cc : 2E ×P → R that takes some set of evidence
and a policy and determines whether (and possibly
how) this policy is satisfied by the specified set of
evidence. The exact definition of satisfaction is spe-
cific to the policy language being used. For example,
in any language with a model theory, we say that
a set E of evidence satisfies a policy p if in every
model where E is true, p is also true. In Clouseau,
a policy is specified as one or more patterns plac-
ing constraints on the credentials and other evidence
that must be presented to gain access to a particu-
lar resource. We say that such a policy is satisfied
if at least one of these patterns can be matched by
the set of objects describing the credentials and other
evidence possessed by a given entity. As we will see
in Section 5, proving the correctness of our RT to
Clouseau policy compilation process involves prov-
ing an equivalence between these two concepts of sat-
isfaction. That is, we must show that an Clouseau
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pattern-match occurs if and only if the RT rules of
inference draw the same conclusion.
When a compliance checker is invoked to check the
satisfaction of some policy protecting a local resource
r, it will be given a set of evidence provided by the re-
mote entity wishing to access r. In this case, the com-
pliance checker need only return a Boolean value indi-
cating whether the policy was satisfied (i.e., R ≡ B).
However, if local credentials are used in an attempt
to satisfy a remote policy p, then R ≡ 22E . That is,
the compliance checker must return zero or more sets
of local evidence that minimally satisfy p so that the
local entity knows which local evidence can be sent
to the remote entity to gain access to the resource
protected by p. We say that some set E of evidence
minimally satisfies a policy p if no proper subset of
E also satisfies p. A compliance checker capable of
recognizing all possible subsets of the local evidence
that minimally satisfy a given policy is required to
ensure that a trust negotiation protocol will establish
trust whenever possible and can also afford its user a
number of strategic advantages. Therefore, our focus
in this paper is to efficiently solve the following spe-
cific instance of the more general policy compliance
checking problem:
The Type-3 Compliance Checker Problem.
Given a set E ∈ E of evidence and a policy p ∈ P, find
all distinct subsets sets e1, . . . , en of E that minimally
satisfy p.
4 Design of Clouseau
In this section we discuss the design of the Clouseau
compliance checker, which we have designed to effi-
ciently solve the type-3 compliance checker problem.
We begin by showing that this problem naturally
translates into an instance of the many pattern/many
object pattern match problem. This is followed by a
discussion of the technical details of our implemen-
tation of the Clouseau compliance checker, includ-
ing an overview of the Rete algorithm, which is used
by Clouseau. Lastly, we conclude this section with
an overview of Clouseau’s internal representation
of trust negotiation evidence and policies.
4.1 Design Approach
To date, most policy languages for trust negotiation
are modeled using logic programming approaches, as
the formal semantics of logic programs are well un-
derstood. For example, policies in Cassandra [3],
PSPL [9], the language used by Koshutanski and
Massacci [16], RT [18], and PeerAccess [25] are all
specified in this manner. Even some XML-based lan-
guages, such as TPL, are formally modeled using
logic programming approaches [15]. Not surprisingly,
the policy compliance checking approaches used for
these types of languages have leveraged traditional
theorem-proving techniques. When the compliance
checker is invoked on a policy p with a set E of ev-
idence, the underlying theorem prover stores the set
of evidence e ⊆ E used during the construction of a
single proof that p was satisfied. Rather than simply
returning the Boolean value true, the set e is also re-
turned by the compliance checker to provide support
for its decision.
Although this type of theorem-proving approach
to the general compliance checker problem is natural
given the logical foundations of trust management, it
is not the only way in which this problem can be for-
mulated. In fact, using this type of approach to solve
the type-3 compliance checker problem is unappeal-
ing, as theorem provers in general are designed to find
a single proof that a fact is valid (i.e., that a policy is
satisfied) and search for alternate proofs only when a
given proof attempt fails. As an alternate approach,
we have recognized that the the type-3 compliance
checker problem is actually an instance of the more
general many pattern/many object pattern matching
problem [13]:
The Many Pattern/Many Object Pattern
Matching Problem. Given a set of patterns and a
set of objects, determine all of the ways in which the
set of objects can be used to match any of the specified
patterns.
Clearly, if credentials and other evidence are
treated as objects and policy clauses are treated as
patterns, an efficient solution to this problem could
likely lead to an efficient solution to the type-3 com-
pliance checker problem. This problem has been
studied previously by the artificial intelligence com-
munity, as it is central to the design of efficient pro-
duction system interpreters. As a result, efficient al-
gorithms, such as Rete [13] and TREAT [19], have
been developed to solve this problem. The Rete al-
gorithm is optimized for instances of the many pat-
tern/many object pattern matching problem in which
(i) patterns are compilable, (ii) all objects remain
constant once inserted into the Rete engine’s work-
ing memory, and (iii) the set of objects changes rel-
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atively slowly [13]. Note that trust negotiation poli-
cies are all compilable, as they are designed to enable
automated reasoning, rather than human interpreta-
tion. Further, credentials and other evidence remain
constant once obtained. For example, modifying or
tampering with a digital certificate invalidates its at-
tached issuer signature. Lastly, the set of local ev-
idence changes very infrequently and the set of re-
mote evidence grows monotonically as the protocol
proceeds. We therefore use the Rete algorithm as the
basis for the Clouseau compliance checker.
4.2 The Rete Algorithm
We now provide an overview of the Rete algorithm
and highlight its benefits in solving the type-3 com-
pliance checker problem. Space limitations prevent a
full discussion of the specifics of the Rete algorithm;
interested readers should consult [13] for more infor-
mation. At a high level, the Rete algorithm works
by forming a network of nodes that represent one or
more matching tests found in the specified patterns.
Pattern nodes, which are also known as one-input
nodes, are used to match single objects stored in the
working memory of the Rete engine. In the case of
Clouseau, these objects represent constraints on in-
dividual pieces of trust negotiation evidence such as
digital certificates and uncertified claims. The out-
puts of these pattern nodes can then be fed into one
or more join nodes, which are used to build more
complex patterns consisting of conjunctions of basic
patterns and constraints existing between the objects
matched by these patterns. In our formulation of
the type-3 compliance checker problem, join nodes
are used to specify conjunctions of basic credentials
as well as inter-credential constraints (i.e., chains of
trust or credential delegations).
A collection of pattern nodes and join nodes forms
a directed acyclic graph whose sink nodes are called
terminal nodes. As matches occur in the Rete net-
work, information describing the match is propagated
along the edges of the graph. When a terminal node
is reached, an event is triggered that signifies that a
complete match has occurred. In Clouseau, this im-
plies that a given policy has been satisfied and enables
the compliance checker to extract the set of evidence
that led to this particular policy satisfaction. Since
information is propagated along all possible edges in
the Rete network, all satisfying sets are found by the
Rete algorithm.
Figure 2 is an illustration of a Rete network for the
policy p← a ∧ b ∧ (c ∨ (d ∧ e)), which is represented
?c ?a ?b ?d ?e
^ ^
^ ^
p
Pattern nodes
Join nodes
Terminal node
Figure 2: An example Rete network.
internally as the pair of Horn clauses p ← a, b, c and
p ← a, b, d, e. Square boxes represent pattern nodes,
the trapezoids are join nodes, and the oval node is a
terminal node that represents the satisfaction of the
policy p. Note that distinct patterns are matched
at most once, despite appearing in multiple Horn
clauses. Further, join nodes can be shared between
multiple clauses of the policy.
Another benefit of the Rete approach is that the
network maintains state between invocations, which
greatly minimizes the number of times that the work-
ing memory is iterated over as multiple policies are
matched. That is, each object in the Rete engine’s
working memory is matched against each pattern
node at most one time and the results of this match-
ing operation are saved. For instance, if the policy
p′ ← a ∧ b ∧ (c ∨ f) is added to the working mem-
ory of the Rete engine in Figure 2, the Rete engine
needs only to check for the existence of credential f ,
as any matches for a∧ b and a∧ b∧ c were found and
memoized during the analysis of the policy p. These
types of optimizations further help make the Rete al-
gorithm an efficient approach to solving the type-3
compliance checker problem.
4.3 Implementation
We now describe our implementation of Clouseau,
a fully-functional compliance checker that leverages
the Rete algorithm to efficiently solve the type-3
compliance checker problem. Our goal in designing
Clouseau was not to propose a new trust negoti-
ation policy language, but rather to explore the de-
sign of efficient solutions to the type-3 compliance
checker problem. Therefore, rather than designing
Clouseau to check the satisfaction of policies spec-
ified in one particular policy language (e.g., Cassan-
dra, RT , TPL, or X -TNL), we instead focus on de-
signing a more general-purpose compliance checker.
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Ultimately, the access control policies used by trust
negotiation systems are satisfied by digital certificates
or other such evidence presented by participants in
the negotiation process. To this end, the policy pat-
terns used to construct the Rete network analyzed by
Clouseau specify constraints on the actual evidence
(e.g., certificates, certificate chains, and claims) nec-
essary to gain access to a particular resource. This
is in contrast to higher-level policy languages, such
as RT , which have syntactic constructs to represent
concepts such as delegation natively. In Section 5, we
discuss a process through which RT policies can be
automatically compiled into the native rule format
used by Clouseau for analysis. Since all trust ne-
gotiation policies are eventually satisfied by the same
types of evidence, we believe that equivalent compi-
lation procedures could be derived for other higher-
level policy languages as well.
Our implementation of Clouseau was developed
using the Java programming language. At a high
level, Clouseau takes a set E of evidence and an ac-
cess control policy p and uses an implementation of
the Rete algorithm provided by the Jess expert sys-
tem [14] to determine all of the ways in which subsets
of E can satisfy p. The running time of this Rete
implementation scales, on average, linearly with the
size of its working memory [14]. This implies that
Clouseau’s running time scales as O(NA), where N
is the number of satisfying sets for a policy and A
is the average size of each satisfying set; we confirm
this result experimentally in Section 6. Our imple-
mentation consists of a Jess specification defining the
internal representations of evidence and several use-
ful functions for reasoning about credential chains,
and a larger Java code base responsible for examining
various types of evidence, translating evidence into
objects that can be instantiated within Clouseau,
and creating and querying the Rete network used by
Clouseau. We now discuss the internal represen-
tation of evidence used by Clouseau as well as the
specification of access control policies.
Evidence Representation
Because Jess provides a general-purpose implemen-
tation of the Rete algorithm, it has no way of rep-
resenting or reasoning about trust negotiation evi-
dence natively. We therefore had to define several
object templates that represent key types of evidence
inside of the Rete engine’s working memory. The cur-
rent implementation of Clouseau supports the use
of digital certificates, certificate chains, and uncerti-
;; Used to describe digital certificates and
;; other credentials
(deftemplate credential
(slot id)
(slot issuer)
(slot subject)
(slot fingerprint)
(slot owned (default FALSE))
(slot map (default (new java.util.HashMap))))
;; Contains an ordered list of credentials making
;; up a credential chain
(deftemplate credential-chain
(multislot credentials))
;; Claims are stored as attribute/value pairs
(deftemplate claim
(slot id)
(slot type)
(slot value))
Figure 3: Internal evidence representations used by
Clouseau.
fied claims as forms of evidence; adding support for
other types of evidence, such as Trust-X trust tickets,
would be a relatively straightforward process.
Clouseau makes use of an extensible credential
type hierarchy that allows trust negotiation imple-
mentations to add support for new credential types
to Clouseau without modifying its code base. Trust
negotiation implementations are responsible for val-
idating any proof-of-ownership challenges associated
with a given credential and for forming and verifying
the credential chains passed into Clouseau. Once
a collection of credential chains has been passed into
Clouseau, they are translated into instances of the
credential and credential-chain object types de-
scribed in Figure 3. Uncertified claims provided as
evidence to Clouseau are represented internally as
instances of the claim object type.
Objects of type credential are generated by ex-
tracting information from a given cryptographic cre-
dential using methods of the abstract credential class
at the top of Clouseau’s credential type hierarchy.
Each credential structure is assigned a unique iden-
tifier and contains fields describing the credential’s
subject and issuer, a cryptographic fingerprint of the
credential, a Boolean value indicating whether proof-
of-ownership of the credential was verified, and a map
containing key/value pairs describing attributes (e.g.,
job function, hire date, etc.) or other information
(e.g., expiry date) embedded in the credential. In-
ternally, credential chains are represented as ordered
lists of unique identifiers satisfying two invariants: (i)
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;; This policy is satisfied by graduate students at ABET-
;; accredited universities who provide an email address
;; that can be used for future correspondence.
(defrule rule-grad-student
;; Find a certificate chain leading from a university
;; to a graduate student
(credential (id ?iuniv) (subject ?suniv))
(credential (id ?istud) (owned true) (map ?mstud))
(test (eq "Graduate Student" (?mstud get "Type")))
(credential-chain (credentials $?cstud))
(test (is-root ?iuniv ?cstud))
(test (is-leaf ?istud ?cstud))
;; Find a certificate chain leading from ABET to
;; the university found above.
(credential (id ?iabet) (fingerprint
"38:1A:42:E9:00:7D:19:41:AC:66:F2:EF:12:E6:B4:A1"))
(credential (id ?icert) (map ?mcert)
(subject ?scert &: (eq ?scert ?suniv)))
(test (eq "Accredited University" (?mcert get "Type")))
(credential-chain (credentials $?ccert)
(test (is-root ?iabet ?ccert))
(test (is-nth ?icert 2 ?ccert))
;; See if the student provided an email address
(claim (id ?iemail) (type "Email") (value ?v))
=>
(assert (satisfaction (resource-name server)
(credentials ?cstud ?ccert)
(claims ?iemail))))
Figure 4: An example Clouseau policy.
the credential referenced by the identifier at index 0
in the list is the root of the credential chain and (ii)
the credential referenced by the identifier at index
i > 0 was issued by the owner of the credential at
index i− 1. Uncertified claims are represented as at-
tribute/value pairs associated with a unique identifier
field.
Policy Specification
In Clouseau, access control policies are specified as
collections of Jess rules that place constraints on the
credentials, credential chains, and uncertified claims
that must be presented to gain access to a particular
resource. In the remainder of this section, we pro-
vide a overview of the Clouseau policy syntax by
discussing an example access control policy. We note
that only a very small subset of the Jess language is
needed to specify Clouseau policies. In particular,
we use only the language constructs discussed in this
section.
Figure 4 is an example access control policy de-
signed to allow graduate students at universities ac-
credited by the Accreditation Board for Engineer-
ing and Technology (ABET) to access some resource
“server,” provided that they disclose an email address
that can be used for future correspondence. Because
of the relatively simple nature of this policy, it can be
specified using a single Jess rule. Rules consist of two
parts: a left hand side (LHS) specifying patterns that
must be matched by objects in the working memory
of the Rete engine and a right hand side (RHS) that
specifies some action to be taken if the pattern in the
LHS of the rule is completely matched. These two
parts of a rule are separated by the => token.
The LHS of the rule in Figure 4 consists of three
groups of patterns that must be matched by objects
in the working memory of the Rete engine represent-
ing trust negotiation evidence. The first group deter-
mines whether there exists a certificate chain whose
leaf node is a certificate of type “Graduate Student.”
The first line of this group is a pattern that matches
any credential and saves the values of its unique iden-
tifier and subject string in the variables ?iuniv and
?suniv, respectively. The second line in this group-
ing is a similar pattern that matches any credential
whose ownership was proven during the trust negotia-
tion protocol. The third line in this grouping enforces
the constraint that the second credential matched has
a “Type” field whose value is “Graduate Student.”
The last three lines of the first grouping require that
the two matched credentials must exist in a creden-
tial chain whose authenticity was verified by the trust
negotiation implementation. Note that a given pat-
tern need not constrain all fields of the credential
object type.
The second group of patterns is similar to the
first, in that it also establishes the existence of an-
other credential chain. The first two lines of this
of this group form a pattern that matches only the
certificate whose cryptographic fingerprint is repre-
sented by the hexadecimal string 38:1A:42:E9:00:
7D:19:41:AC:66:F2:EF:12:E6:B4:A1, which is the
fingerprint of the (fictitious) certificate used by
ABET to issue university accreditations. The third,
fourth, and fifth lines of this group form a pattern
that matches any credential that has a subject field
that is the same as that of the root of the first cre-
dential chain (i.e., the university), and has a “Type”
field whose value is “Accredited University.” The last
two lines of this pattern place the constraint that the
ABET credential must form the root of a credential
chain of length two that ends with the university’s ac-
creditation certificate. The last group of constraints
consists of a single line specifying that the user needs
to also disclose an uncertified claim of type “Email”
containing his or her email address, which will pre-
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sumably be stored for future correspondence.
In general, the RHS of an Clouseau policy can
either assert an intermediate result that can be used
as input to other rules, or assert a satisfaction ob-
ject describing one way in which a particular policy
was satisfied. The former action might be taken if a
complicated policy has several paths to satisfaction
that each require a common prefix to be matched;
we will see examples of this in Section 5.2. The pol-
icy in Figure 4 takes the latter action and asserts a
satisfaction object containing the set of credentials
and the single claim used to satisfy the policy.
We note that despite a simple policy specification
syntax, Clouseau policies can quickly become large
and difficult to understand due to the number of
constraints that might exist between elements of a
credential chain or fields of credentials in different
chains. However, we do not view this as a limita-
tion of Clouseau. We do not expect that users
of Clouseau will choose to specify policies using
this subset of Jess. Rather, we view the native pol-
icy representation used by Clouseau as being akin
to assembly language in that it provides a represen-
tation of a potentially-complex expression that can
be efficiently analyzed. We expect that users will
specify policies in higher-level trust negotiation pol-
icy languages and that these policies will be auto-
matically compiled intoClouseau’s native language,
much as programs written in high-level programming
languages are compiled into assembly code prior to
execution.
5 Analyzing RT Policies
In this section, we discuss a method for automati-
cally compiling RT policies into a format suitable for
analysis by Clouseau. For ease of exposition, we
begin by discussing a compilation process for RT 0
policies, which support the use of unparameterized
roles, and prove the correctness and completeness of
this process. We then provide an intuition for how
this process can be extended to support RT 1 policies
allowing the use of parameterized roles. The ability to
correctly analyze these types of policies is a necessary
step towards establishing Clouseau as a general-
purpose solution to the type-3 compliance checker
problem. Since all trust negotiation policies are even-
tually satisfied by the same types of evidence, we con-
jecture that equivalent compilation procedures could
be devised for other higher-level policy languages as
well.
5.1 RT 0 Policy Syntax
Recall from [18] that RT 0 is the most basic language
in the RT family of trust management languages. As
in all of the RT languages, principals are identified by
means of identity certificates. RT 0 roles are defined
simply as strings identifying the name of the role and
cannot be parameterized. Policy statements in RT 0
are expressed as one or more of these role definitions
and are encoded as role definition credentials signed
by the author of the role definition. There are four
basic types of role definition credentials in RT 0:
Simple Member A role definition of the form
KA.R← KD encodes the fact that principal KA
considers principal KD to be a member of the
role KA.R.
Simple Containment A role definition of the form
KA.R ← KB .R1 encodes the fact that principal
KA defines the roleKA.R to contain all members
of the role KB .R1, which is defined by principal
KB .
Linking Containment A role definition of the
form KA.R ← KA.R1.R2 is called a linked role.
This defines the members of KA.R to contain all
members ofKB .R2 for eachKB that is a member
of KA.R1.
Intersection Containment The role definition
KA.R ← KB1 .R1 ∩ · · · ∩KBn .Rn defines KA.R
to contain the principals who are members of
each role KBi .Ri where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
These four basic types of role definitions can be
used to define a wide range of access control policies.
For example, the following RT 0 role definitions ex-
press an access control policy requiring that entities
accessing a given resource be employees of a Super-
Grid member organization:
Provider .service ← Provider .partner .employee
Provider .partner ← SuperGrid .memberOrganization
If a principal, Alice, could pro-
vide credentials proving the statements
SuperGrid .memberOrganization ← AliceLabs
and AliceLabs.employee ← Alice, she could satisfy
the policy formed by the above two role definitions
and gain access to the protected service.
5.2 Compiling RT 0 Policies
In RT 0, policies are collections of role definition cre-
dentials. Therefore, we must preprocess the set of
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;; Template to store role membership information
(deftemplate is-member
(slot role)
(slot roleMgr)
(slot roleSubj)
(multislot credentials))
;; Code to detect role memberships via the presence of simple
;; membership policy credentials. I.e., this can prove that
;; K_A.R <- K_B
(defrule member-of
;; Match K_B’s identity certificate
(credential (id ?kb) (fingerprint ?fkb))
;; Prove that K_A says that K_B is in role R
(credential (id ?ka) (fingerprint ?fka))
(credential (id ?r) (map ?m))
(test (eq ?fka (?m get "roleMgr")))
(test (eq ?fkb (?m get "roleSubj")))
(credential-chain (credentials $?c))
(test (is-root ?ka ?c))
(test (is-nth ?r 2 ?c))
=>
(assert (is-member (role (?m get "role"))
(roleMgr (?m get "roleMgr"))
(roleSubj (?m get "roleSubj"))
(credentials ?ka ?kb ?r))))
Figure 5: Base policy enabling Clouseau to deter-
mine role membership via the use of simple member-
ship credentials.
credentials provided to Clouseau as input in order
to generate the set of policy rules that Clouseau will
attempt to satisfy. Since Clouseau examines the ac-
tual credentials used to hold RT 0 assertions, rather
than these higher-level RT 0 assertions, we must make
a few assumptions regarding the format of these cre-
dentials.
1. We assume that principals in the sys-
tem are identified by the fingerprint of
their identity certificates. Text strings
such as “ABET .accredited” will be used
during the discussion of abstract poli-
cies, although such assertions are ac-
tually shorthand for statements such as
“38:1A:42:E9:00:7D:19:41:AC:66:F2:EF:12:
E6:B4:A1.accredited.” When defining
Clouseau policies later in this section, we
will use the notation <K A> to denote the
fingerprint of KA’s identity certificate.
2. Simple membership role definition credentials of
form KA.R ← KB are assumed to have the at-
tributes “roleMgr,” “role,” and “roleSubj” set to
the values <K A>, R, and <K B>, respectively.
3. Role definition credentials are valid if and only
if they are signed by the principal identified at
the head of the credential. For example, the sim-
ple membership credential KA.R ← KB is con-
sidered valid if and only if it is signed by the
principal KA.
Given the above assumptions regarding credential
format, we now describe an algorithm for generating
a Clouseau policy p′ that is equivalent to an RT 0
policy p consisting of the valid role definition cre-
dentials r1, . . . , rn and the set of identity certificates
c1, . . . , cm.
1. Insert the is-member template type and the
member-of rule defined in Figure 5 into p′. The
is-member object type holds information regard-
ing a particular principal’s membership in a par-
ticular role. The member-of rule asserts an
is-member object if a simple membership role
definition credential of form KA.R ← KB can
be found, along with identity certificates for KA
and KB .
2. Generate the credential objects corresponding
to the identity certificates c1, . . . cm and insert
these into the working memory of Clouseau.
3. For each valid role definition credential ri:
• Generate the credential object corre-
sponding to ri and insert it into the working
memory of Clouseau. Save the “id” field
of this object as the variable <id>.
• If ri is a simple containment credential of
form KA.R ← KB .R1 then insert the fol-
lowing rule into p′:
(defrule rule-sc-<id>
(is-member (role "R_1") (roleMgr <K_B>)
(roleSubj ?rs) (credentials $?c))
=>
(assert (is-member (role "R") (roleMgr <K_A>)
(roleSubj ?rs)
(credentials ?c <id>)))
This rule asserts that a principal is a mem-
ber of role KA.R if he is also a member of
KB .R1.
• If ri is a linking containment credential of
form KA.R ← KA.R1.R2 then insert the
following rule into p′:
(defrule rule-lc-<id>
;; Find a member of R_2
(is-member (role "R_2") (roleMgr ?r2mgr)
(roleSubj ?r2subj) (credentials $?cr2))
;; find a member of K_A.R_1
(is-member (role "R_1") (roleMgr <K_A>)
(roleSubj ?r1subj)
(credentials $?cr1))
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(test (eq ?r1subj ?r2mgr))
=>
(assert (is-member (role "R") (roleMgr <K_A>)
(roleSubj ?r2subj)
(credentials ?cr1 ?cr2 <id>)))
This rule asserts that a principal is a mem-
ber of the roleKA.R if he is a member of the
role R2 defined by some member of KA.R1.
• If ri is an intersection containment creden-
tial of form KA.R← KB1 .R1∩· · ·∩KBk .Rk
then insert the following rule into p′:
(defrule rule-ic-<id>
(is-member (role "R_1") (roleMgr <K_B_1>)
(roleSubj ?rs1) (credentials $?cr1))
...
(is-member (role "R_k") (roleMgr <K_B_k>)
(roleSubj ?rsk &: (eq ?rs1 ?rsk))
(credentials $?crk))
=>
(assert (is-member (role "R") (roleMgr <K_A>)
(roleSubj ?rs1)
(credentials ?cr1 ... ?crk <id>)))
This rule asserts that a principal is a mem-
ber of the role KA.R if role memberships
for each of the roles KB1 .R1, . . . ,KBk .Rk
can be found. Note that this rule enforces
the constraint that these role membership
must all refer to the same subject principal.
4. Given the target role for the negotiation, say
KA.Rt, insert the following rule into p′:
(defrule target
(is-member (role "R_t") (roleMgr <K_A>) (roleSubj ?rs)
(credentials $?c))
(credential (fingerprint ?fp &: (eq ?fp ?rs))
(owned TRUE))
=>
(assert (satisfaction (resource-name "target")
(credentials ?c))))
This rule triggers the insertion of a policy sat-
isfaction object whenever an identity certificate
with valid proof-of-ownership can be found for a
member of the target role KA.Rt.
Intuitively, this compilation process works in a
bottom-up fashion, as follows. The member-of rule
enables Clouseau to conclude that a principal KB
is a member of the role KA.R if it finds KB ’s identity
certificate, KA’s identity certificate, and the simple
membership role definition certificate declaring KB
to be a member of KA.R. These three credentials
are retained as evidence supporting KB ’s member-
ship in KA.R. The rules inserted during step 3 of
the compilation process can then combine these ba-
sic role membership assertions to prove membership
in roles defined by more complex expressions (i.e.,
simple containment, linking containment, and inter-
section containment).
As role membership assertions are combined by
these rules, the credential identifiers stored in these
role membership assertions are combined and stored
in the newly-concluded role membership assertions.
Finally, the target rule inserted into p′ at step 4 of
the compilation process asserts a satisfaction ob-
ject whenever membership in the target role of the
negotiation process can be found for a principal who
could demonstrate proof-of-ownership of his or her
identity certificate. This allows Clouseau to con-
clude that the policy in question has been satisfied
and to extract the credentials used during the sat-
isfaction process. The Rete algorithm ensures that
all paths leading to the creation of a satisfaction
object are explored during the pattern matching pro-
cess, which implies that all satisfying sets of evidence
are discovered by the Clouseau compliance checker.
Further, an increase in the size of the RT policy to be
analyzed causes only a linear increase in the running
time of Clouseau. This is a result of the fact that
the size of Clouseau’s working memory is increased
linearly for each credential analyzed during the pol-
icy compilation process (i.e., we add at most one rule
to Clouseau for each credential processed).
Figure 6 illustrates the result of applying the above
compilation process to the RT 0 access policy de-
scribed in Section 5.1. For brevity, the is-member
template and the member-of rule in Figure 5 were
omitted from this figure, although they would be in-
cluded in the generated policy. We now make the
following claim regarding the correctness and com-
pleteness of this policy compilation process. A full
proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 (Correctness and Completeness). Let
R = {r1, . . . , rn} be a set of role definition creden-
tials, C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a set of identity certificates,
p = R∪C be an RT 0 policy, and let p′ be the result of
compiling p using the above process. Clouseau finds
the satisfying set S ⊆ (R ∪ C) of credentials for the
policy p′ if and only if the RT rules of inference can
be used on exactly the set S of credentials to prove
membership in the target role.
5.3 Supporting RT 1 Policies
The only feature that RT 1 adds to RT 0 is the ability
to parameterize role definitions. For example, rather
than requiring Alice’s employee credential to be of
the form AliceLabs.employee ← Alice, it could in-
stead encode other attributes regarding Alice’s em-
ployment. For example, we could define Alice as the
11
;; Provider.service <- Provider.partner.employee
(defrule rule-1
(is-member (role "employee") (roleMgr ?r2mgr)
(roleSubj ?r2subj) (credentials $?cr2))
(is-member (role "partner") (roleMgr <Provider>)
(roleSubj ?r1subj)
(credentials $?cr1))
(test (eq ?r1subj ?r2mgr))
=>
(assert (is-member (role "service") (roleMgr <Provider>)
(roleSubj ?r2subj)
(credentials ?cr1 ?cr2 <id>)))
;; Provider.partner <- SuperGrid.memberOrganization
(defrule rule-2
(is-member (role "memberOrganization") (roleMgr <SuperGrid>)
(roleSubj ?rs) (credentials $?c))
=>
(assert (is-member (role "partner") (roleMgr <Provider>)
(roleSubj ?rs) (credentials ?c <id>)))
;; Provider.service is our target role
(defrule target
(is-member (role "service") (roleMgr <Provider>)
(roleSubj ?rs) (credentials $?c))
(credential (fingerprint ?fp &: (eq ?fp ?rs))
(owned TRUE))
=>
(assert (satisfaction (resource-name "target")
(credentials ?c))))
Figure 6: A compiled version of the RT 0 policy dis-
cussed in Section 5.1.
President of AliceLabs by defining the following sim-
ple membership credential:
AliceLabs.employee(title=“President”)← Alice
RT 1 role definition credentials can also constrain
role memberships based on the values of role param-
eters. For example, the following simple containment
credential declares that only widgets whose price is
over $10 are on sale:
Acme.sale ← Acme.widget(price > 10)
Adding support for the above types of parameteri-
zations and constraints to the policy compilation pro-
cess described in Section 5.2 is a relatively straight-
forward process. In fact, we must only (i) provide
support for storing parameters and their values in
simple membership role definition credentials and (ii)
allow the various containment role definition rules
generated during the policy compilation process to
place constraints on these parameter values. To ad-
dress (i), we can store the parameters of a given
simple membership credential and their correspond-
ing values in the “map” field of the simple member-
ship’s Clouseau credential object. Further, the
is-member object template must be extended to in-
clude this mapping of parameter names to values.
Addressing point (ii) is a slightly more complicated
process involving the generation of Clouseau rules
during step 3 of the compilation process. Rather than
explain each case in detail, we will instead provide one
example compilation rule and claim that the other
cases can be handled in a similar fashion. As an ex-
ample, consider the following simple containment role
definition credential:
AliceLabs.seniorManagement←
AliceLabs.employee(hireYr < 2000, mgt = true)
This credential defines members of the “Senior
Management” role at AliceLabs to be managers hired
before the year 2000. A policy compiler could parse
the above type of role definition credential to form
the following rule:
(defrule rule-<id>
(is-member (role "employee") (roleMgr <AliceLabs>) (map ?m)
(roleSubj ?rs) (credentials $?c))
(test (eq TRUE (?m get "mgt")))
(test (> 2000 (?m get "hireYr")))
=>
(assert (is-member (role "seniorManagement") (roleSubj ?rs)
(roleMgr <AliceLabs>)
(credentials ?c <id>)))
Creating this rule automatically involves an exten-
sion to the rule generation logic presented in Sec-
tion 5.2 that adds one test clause to the rule for every
constraint placed on an attribute value by the RT 1
role definition credential. Since the Rete engine used
by Clouseau supports comparison operators such as
>, <, and =, it can support the types of constraints
allowed by RT 1. As such, it is possible to define an
automated procedure for compiling RT 1 policies into
a format suitable for analysis by Clouseau.
6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the
Clouseau compliance checker and then discuss the
implications of our findings. In particular, we exam-
ine the amount of time required to find all satisfying
sets of evidence for a given policy in three sets of
experiments; each set of experiments was conducted
on a 2.5GHz Pentium 4 with 512MB RAM run-
ning Linux. The running times reported include all
overheads associated with generating a Rete network
based on the policy rules provided to Clouseau,
creating credential and credential-chain objects
corresponding to the credentials and credential chains
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Figure 7: Running time as a function of the size of
the union of all satisfying sets.
provided to Clouseau, inserting these objects into
Clouseau’s working memory, and recovering all sat-
isfying sets of credentials. We first repeat the exper-
iments conducted in [21], which explored the over-
heads associated with using a type-2 compliance
checker to solve the type-3 compliance checker prob-
lem.
6.1 Experimental Results
The three most interesting cases explored in [21] ex-
amined the overheads of using the SSGen algorithm
to find all satisfying sets of credentials for a policy in
the event that (i) the policy had one satisfying set of
size U , (ii) the policy had U satisfying sets of size one,
or (iii) the policy had two satisfying sets, each of size
3U
4 . In all cases, U represents the size of the union of
all satisfying sets. Recall from Figure 1 in Section 2
that the overheads associated with cases (ii) and (iii)
grew exponentially and quickly became impractical.
Figure 7 shows the results of running these same tests
using the Clouseau compliance checker; note that
the y-axis of Figure 1 is labeled in seconds, while the
y-axis of Figure 7 is labeled in milliseconds. In our
experiments, we varied the size of the union of all sat-
isfying sets (U) between 1 and 50. Each data point
in the figure represents the average running time over
100 randomly-generated policies; a new Rete network
was constructed for each of these 100 trials as to elim-
inate any optimizations that might occur as a result
of partial network reuse as discussed in Section 4.2.
We see that, in all cases, the running time overheads
of Clouseau grow linearly with U and never exceed
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Figure 8: Running time as the number of satisfying
sets and the size of each satisfying set varies.
80 ms to find all satisfying sets. We note also that,
unlike the SSgen algorithm, Clouseau does not re-
quire that policies be specified in DNF form in order
to efficiently find all satisfying sets.
To further explore the running time characteris-
tics of Clouseau, we conducted another experiment
designed to more fully examine the types of policies
that might be processed by Clouseau in practice. In
this experiment, we varied both the number of sat-
isfying sets contained in a particular policy and the
size of each satisfying set. For each 〈number, size〉
pair, 100 policies were generated at random and ex-
amined using Clouseau. The random generation of
policies allowed us to explore cases in which satis-
fying sets overlap with one another to varying de-
grees. This is important because overlapping sat-
isfying sets will result in shared nodes in the Rete
network constructed by Clouseau and, thus, more
efficient analysis; examining a random sampling of
policies provides us with a more “average case” view
of Clouseau’s performance. The results of this ex-
periment are shown in Figure 8 and confirm that the
performance of Clouseau scales as O(NA), where N
is the number of satisfying sets and A is the average
size of each satisfying set. We then considered the
case in which each credential was assigned a sensitiv-
ity value by its owner, as in [26], and ran the above
experiments again. Given the satisfying sets detected
by Clouseau, it took a trust negotiation strategy,
on average, only 0.04 ms to choose the least-sensitive
satisfying set to disclose.
We next sought to evaluate the performance of
Clouseau in a worst-case scenario. To accomplish
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this, we analyzed policies of the form p← (c1 ∨ c2)∧
· · · ∧ (c2i−1 ∨ c2i), which can be satisfied in 2i differ-
ent ways by a set of 2i credentials. Figure 9 shows
the results of this experiment, which confirm that
the performance of Clouseau continues to scale as
O(NA) (note that the x-axis of Figure 9 follows a
logarithmic scale). Policies with exponentially-many
satisfying sets are unlikely to be used legitimately in
practice, but could be formed by attackers wishing
to consume inordinate amounts of system resources.
Detecting these types of malicious policies in practice
is out of the scope of our current paper, and thus we
defer that topic to future work. We do note, however,
that Clouseau found 512 satisfying sets of creden-
tials in approximately 1 second. This implies that
the naive strategy of capping the time spent in the
compliance checker might be a reasonable means of
detecting these types of attacks in practice, as find-
ing that many satisfying sets of credentials for a non-
attack policy seems exceedingly unlikely.
In all of our experiments, a completely new
Rete network was created at each invocation of
Clouseau. As stated previously, this was done
to eliminate the possible benefits of partial network
sharing between distinct policies, as network sharing
improves the performance of Clouseau. However,
some of the primary benefits of the Rete algorithm
arise precisely because the state encoded in a par-
ticular Rete network can be saved between invoca-
tions of the matching algorithm, which reduces the
number of times objects (i.e., credentials and other
evidence) need to be matched against the pattern
nodes (i.e., policy clauses) in the network. If a par-
ticipant in the trust negotiation process is willing to
trade memory for execution time, they could main-
tain a separate Rete network for each ongoing negoti-
ation constructed using all of the policies relevant to
that particular negotiation. This would allow them
to leverage the statefulness of the Rete algorithm to
reduce the number of matching operations required
at each invocation of Clouseau and obtain better
performance as the negotiation proceeds into later
rounds. Further examination of these types of speed
versus memory trade offs is an interesting direction
for future work.
6.2 Discussion
The experiments discussed above illustrate that our
Clouseau implementation performs very quickly, re-
quiring only tens of milliseconds to find all satis-
fying sets of credentials for policies of a reasonable
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Figure 9: Time required to find all 2i satisfying sets
of size 2i for i = 1, . . . , 10.
size. Furthermore, these results experimentally con-
firm our claim that the running time of Clouseau
scales as O(NA), where N is the number of satisfy-
ing sets for the policy being analyzed and A is the
average size of each satisfying set. As always, the
number of satisfying sets for a policy p is in the worst
case exponential in the size of p, as was the case in
the third set of experiments described above. Even
in this case, Clouseau performed admirably, finding
512 satisfying sets of size 18 in just one second; for
ordinary policies, Clouseau will find all satisfying
sets in about as much time as is needed for a single
disk access.
The largest trust management case study to date
is Becker’s formalization of the security policies re-
quired by the electronic health record service that is
being proposed by the United Kingdom’s National
Health Service [2]. This service, also known as the
“Spine,” aims to make electronic patient records
available to medical personnel, patients, and their
designated agents and includes provisions for ensur-
ing the confidentiality of patient records. In [2],
Becker completely specifies a collection of Cassan-
dra [3] policies for the NHS Spine and its related ser-
vices that comply with all available NHS documents
describing the requirements for the Spine. The com-
plete Cassandra specification includes definitions of
375 policy rules, 71 roles, and 12 actions that can
be taken in the system. Each of the rules is a Horn
clause (i.e., a strict conjunction), although often sev-
eral rules will have the same head. For example, there
are several ways in which a clinician can assert that
he or she is the “treating clinician” for a particular
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patient. We will call a set of rules with the same head
a policy, since each such set completely specifies the
ways in which a user can accomplish a particular goal.
Even the most complex policies specified in [2] con-
tain less than a dozen rules, and thus can be satis-
fied in at most this many ways. We see from Fig-
ures 7, 8, and 9 that policies of this size can be effi-
ciently analyzed by Clouseau in under 100 ms in all
cases. This shows that even when the myriad of re-
quirements concerning patient privacy in the medical
domain are considered, the number of unique ways
that any given policy can be satisfied remains rea-
sonably low. Thus, Clouseau can efficiently handle
the largest and most complex set of realistic policies
assembled to date.
7 Conclusions and Future
Work
In this paper, we described the design and im-
plementation of the Clouseau compliance checker.
Clouseau was designed to efficiently solve the type-
3 compliance checker problem: given a set E of evi-
dence and a policy p, determine all subsets of E that
can be used to minimally satisfy p. Previous solu-
tions for this problem have had running time over-
heads that are exponential in the size of the union of
all satisfying sets. Clouseau’s time overheads scale
linearly in the size of the union of all satisfying sets
for the tests conducted in [21], and as O(NA) in gen-
eral, where N is the number of satisfying sets for
a policy and A is the average size of each satisfying
set. On average, Clouseau requires only tens of mil-
liseconds to find all satisfying sets of credentials for
a given policy.
Clouseau achieves this level of performance by
taking a non-traditional approach to theorem prov-
ing. Rather than directly analyzing access control
policies written in high-level languages (such as Cas-
sandra, RT , TPL, or X -TNL), Clouseau compiles
high-level policies into an intermediate representa-
tion that specifies constraints on the actual creden-
tials and other evidence that must be presented to
gain access to a particular resource. Clouseau then
leverages Rete, an efficient pattern matching algo-
rithm, to enumerate all satisfying sets. In this paper,
we provided a process through which access control
policies specified in the RT language can be auto-
matically compiled into the native rule format ana-
lyzed by Clouseau, and proved its completeness and
correctness. Since all trust negotiation policies are
eventually satisfied by these same types of evidence,
we conjecture that equivalent compilation procedures
could also be derived for other higher-level policy lan-
guages. This allows policy writers to express their
policies concisely using high-level policy languages,
yet still analyze them efficiently.
Although Clouseau is much more efficient than
previous solutions to the type-3 compliance checker
problem, further optimization is still an important
area of future work. Spending tens of milliseconds
during an interaction with their compliance checker is
perfectly reasonable for entities in a peer-to-peer en-
vironment or clients in a client/server setting. How-
ever, servers that must process high volumes of traffic
may need several such interactions for each trust ne-
gotiation session. An interesting direction of future
work is to investigate high-level policy language con-
structs that can be compiled into Clouseau policies
that can be analyzed in a particularly efficient (or
inefficient) manner. Better understanding the lan-
guage constructs that most directly affect compliance
checker performance could help lead to the design of
yet more efficient compliance checkers.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
A role membership proven using the RT rules of in-
ference can be represented as a proof tree in which the
root node represents the target role (i.e., KA.R), in-
termediate nodes represent memberships in interme-
diate roles, and all leaves of the tree represent iden-
tity certificates. All non-leaf nodes of the proof tree
are labeled with the identity of the principal whose
membership in that particular role has been proven.
Figure 10 is an example proof tree proving that Alice
is a member of the Provider .service role as discussed
in Section 5.1. Note that the linking containment
rule Provider .service ← Provider .partner .employee
causes the proof tree to branch: the left branch proves
that AliceLabs is a a member of the Provider .partner
role and the right branch proves that Alice is an em-
ployee of AliceLabs. Given this representation of a
role membership verified using the RT rules of infer-
ence, we now prove the following.
Lemma 1. Let R = {r1, . . . , rn} be a set of role def-
inition credentials, C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a set of iden-
tity certificates, p = R ∪C be an RT 0 policy, and let
Alice : Provider .service
AliceLabs : Provider .partner
Alice : AliceLabs.employee

*
@
@
@I
AliceLabs : SuperGrid.memberOrganization
Alice
6
AliceLabs
6
6
Figure 10: An example RT 0 proof tree.
p′ be the result of compiling p using the process de-
scribed in Section 5.2. If a proof tree with root node
KC : KA.R can be found for p using the RT rules
of inference on a set S ⊆ (R ∪ C) of credentials,
then Clouseau finds the satisfying set S of creden-
tials proving membership in KA.R after analyzing the
compiled policy p′.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the depth of the
proof tree found using the RT rules of inference. The
base case occurs when the proof tree extends one level
beyond the root node. In this case, the proof tree
is the result of a simple membership role definition
KA.R ← KC . The root node of this proof tree is
labeled KC : KA.R and the leaf node of the tree
signifies that KC ’s identity certificate was obtained.
The Clouseau compliance checker would determine
that the policy p′ generated by compiling this base
policy was satisfied, as follows. The simple member-
ship credential containing the assertion KA.R← KC ,
KA’s identity certificate, andKC ’s identity certificate
would match the LHS of the member-of rule inserted
during step 1 of the policy compilation process (see
Figure 5). This rule would assert an is-member ob-
ject defining KC to be a member of KA.R and would
store references to the simple membership credential,
as well as the identity certificates of KC and KA.
Assume that Clouseau can determine member-
ship in any role using the same set of credentials as
RT in all cases where the depth of the proof tree
found using the RT rules of inference is at most n.
To prove thatClouseau can determine role member-
ship using the same set of credentials as RT where
the proof tree found using the RT rules of inference
is of depth n+ 1, we must consider three cases.
Case 1 (Simple Containment): In this case,
the RT inference linking the first and second levels
of the proof tree will occur as a result of processing
some simple containment credentialKA.R← KB .R1.
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The root of the resulting proof tree has one child
node whose label is KC : KB .R1. The subtree of the
proof rooted at this child node is of depth n and thus
Clouseau finds the same set of credentials proving
KC ’s membership in KB .R1 (by the inductive hy-
pothesis) and will assert an is-member object con-
taining this information. This will match the LHS of
the rule-sc-<id> rule inserted after preprocessing
the KA.R ← KB .R1 simple containment credential
during step 3 of the compilation process, which will
then insert an is-member object defining KC to be a
member of KA.R.
Case 2 (Linking Containment): In this case,
the RT inference linking the first and second levels
of the proof tree will occur as a result of processing
a linking containment credential KA ← KA.R1.R2.
The root of the resulting proof tree will have two child
nodes: one labeled KB : KA.R1 asserting that some
principal KB is a member of the role KA.R1, and one
labeled KC : KB .R2 which asserts that KC is a mem-
ber of KB .R2. Because the subproofs rooted at these
two nodes each have a depth of at most n, Clouseau
will have asserted is-member objects describing these
memberships using the same set of credentials by the
inductive hypothesis. These two objects will then
match the LHS of the rule-lc-<id> rule inserted
after preprocessing the KA ← KA.R1.R2 linking con-
tainment credential during step 3 of the compilation
process, which will assert KC ’s membership in KA.R.
Case 3 (Intersection Containment): In this
case, the RT inference linking the first and second
levels of the proof tree will occur as a result of process-
ing an intersection containment credential KA.R ←
KB1 .R1 ∩ · · · ∩ KBm .Rm. The root of the resulting
proof tree will have m child nodes, each labeled to as-
sert KC ’s membership in some role KBi .Ri. Because
the subproofs rooted at these m nodes are of depth
at most n, Clouseau can assert is-member objects
providing evidence of KC ’s membership in these roles
using the same sets of credentials by the inductive hy-
pothesis. These m objects will then match the LHS
of the rule-ic-<id> rule inserted after preprocess-
ing the KA.R← KB1 .R1∩· · ·∩KBm .Rm intersection
containment credential during step 3 of the compila-
tion process, which will assert KC ’s membership in
KA.R.
Since Clouseau can discover the same satisfying
set of credentials as RT in each of these three cases,
it can do so for any policy p′ resulting from the com-
pilation of an RT 0 policy p. For RT to grant access
based on this proof, however, KC must demonstrate
proof of ownership of his or her identity certificate.
Clouseau enforces this same constraint by means
of the target rule, which also requires a demonstra-
tion of proof-of-ownership for KC ’s identity certifi-
cate.
Lemma 2. Let R = {r1, . . . , rn} be a set of role
definition credentials, C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a set of
identity certificates, p = R ∪ C be an RT 0 policy,
and let p′ be the result of compiling p using the pro-
cess described in Section 5.2. If Clouseau asserts a
satisfaction object containing the set S ⊆ (R ∪C)
of credentials that proves KC ’s membership in the
target role KA.R, then this membership can also be
proven using the RT rules of inference on S.
Proof. We say that a set of Clouseau rules
l1, l2, . . . , lj form a chain if an assertion made by the
RHS of l1 matches a pattern on the LHS of l2, an
assertion made by the RHS of l2 matches a pattern
on the LHS of l3, and so on. Our proof then pro-
ceeds by induction on the length of the longest chain
of rules invoked by Clouseau prior to invoking the
target rule. The base case occurs when one rule is
invoked. This can only occur when the member-of
rule is matched by a simple membership credential
KA.R ← KC , the identity certificates of KA and
KC . This will assert an is-member object attest-
ing to KC ’s membership in KA.R. In this case, we
can use the RT rules of inference to determine that
KC is a member of KA.R, as we have both the sim-
ple membership credential KA.R ← KB and KC ’s
identity certificate.
Now, assume that the RT rules of inference can
be used on the policy p to determine membership in
KA.R as long as the length of the longest chain of
rules invoked by Clouseau when analyzing the pol-
icy p′ is less than or equal to n. To prove that the
RT rules of inference can be used to determine mem-
bership in KA.R if the longest chain of rules invoked
by Clouseau is n+1, we must examine three cases.
Case 1 (rule-sc-<id>): Consider the case in
which the last rule in a chain to be invoked by
Clouseau is an instance of the rule-sc-<id> in-
serted by Clouseau upon examining a simple con-
tainment credential KA.R ← KB .R1. The LHS of
this rule would be matched by a single is-member
object asserting KC ’s membership in the role KB .R1.
Since the longest chain of Clouseau rules needed
to assert this object is at most n − 1, the RT rules
of inference could also be used to prove membership
in KB .R1 using the same set of credentials by the
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inductive hypothesis. This membership proof can
be combined with the simple containment credential
KA.R← KB .R1 to prove KC ’s membership in KA.R
using the RT rules of inference.
Case 2 (rule-lc-<id>): Consider the case in
which the last rule in a chain to be invoked by
Clouseau is an instance of the rule-lc-<id> in-
serted by Clouseau upon examining a linking con-
tainment credential KA.R ← KA.R1.R2. The LHS
of this rule would be matched by two is-member ob-
jects: one proving that some KB is a member of
KA.R1 and another proving that KC is a member
of KB .R2. The longest chain of Clouseau rules
needed to assert either of these objects is at most
n − 1 and thus the RT rules of inference could also
be used to prove KA.R1 ← KB and KB .R2 ← KC
using the same set of credentials. These membership
proofs can be combined with the linking containment
credential KA.R ← KA.R1.R2 to prove KC ’s mem-
bership in KA.R using the RT rules of inference.
Case 3 (rule-ic-<id>): Consider the case in
which the last rule in a chain to be invoked by
Clouseau is an instance of the rule-ic-<id> in-
serted by Clouseau upon examining an intersec-
tion containment credential KA.R← KB1 .R1 ∩ · · · ∩
KBm .Rm. The LHS of this rule would be matched by
m is-member objects each proving thatKC is a mem-
ber of some KBi .Ri. The longest chain of Clouseau
rules needed to assert any of these objects is at most
n−1 and thus the RT rules of inference could also be
used to prove KBi .Ri ← KC for 1 ≤ i ≤ m using the
same set of credentials. These memberships can be
combined with the intersection containment creden-
tial KA.R← KB1 .R1 ∩ · · · ∩KBm .Rm to prove KC ’s
membership in KA.R using the RT rules of inference.
Since the RT rules of inference can be used to find
an equivalent proof of membership in the role KA.R
for each of these three cases, we can conclude that
the RT rules of inference can be used on the pol-
icy p to determine an equivalent proof of member-
ship for the principal KC in the role KA.R any time
that Clouseau asserts an is-member object when
analyzing the policy p′. For Clouseau to grant ac-
cess based on this role membership (i.e., assert a
satisfaction object), proof-of-ownership of KC ’s
identity certificate is required by the target rule. RT
also requires this proof-of-ownership prior to granting
access, as the label of the root node of the proof tree
is KC .
Theorem 1 follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2.
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